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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DAMIEN HIRST’S DIAMOND SKULL AND THE CAPITALIST SUBLIME 
LUKE WHITE 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Writing about Damien Hirst is tricky. There is a body of extant literature—Julian 
Stallabrass’s book High Art Lite in particular—which sets out an effective and damning 
critique of the “young British art” of which Hirst was a leading figure, mapping its turn away 
from a socially committed avant-garde position towards an altogether more self-seeking art, 
subsumed into spectacular, “postmodern” cultural consumption.1 This is, indeed, “capitalist 
art,” produced within and entirely accommodated to capital: it is made for purchase by an 
elite class of global capitalists—advertising gurus such as Charles Saatchi and hedge-fund 
billionaires such as Steve Cohen, not to mention the oligarchs and tycoons from Russia and 
East Asia who have more recently risen as Hirst’s clients. Accommodated to their needs and 
interests, it provides a highly ideologised vision of the world. It is, furthermore, a work of the 
media “spectacle” on which present-day capital relies, forming itself in response to the world 
of mass-cultural consumption of which art is increasingly a part. But as such it requires a 
somewhat different exposition from the vanguard art which art criticism generally concerns 
itself with. Accounts such as Stallabrass’s—though I do not dispute the critique they make of 
the ways that such art fails to live up to the standards of the avant-garde—do not go enough 
distance to understanding how such works do function.  
 As “capitalist art,” Hirst’s work is traversed by the ideological contradictions and 
social antagonisms of capital itself, and though it often slides into the ridiculous, at its best it 
has a power to captivate, holding its audiences through its staging (though not as such its 
critique) of the antagonisms of capital in highly condensed, multilayered images, embodied in 
sculptures with a haunting presence. Hirst’s work—in particular his early output—has 
fascinated our culture, and left us with some of the most memorable and iconic images of art 
in the 1990s.  
 Even though Hirst may not be a “good” avant-garde artist, and even though I would 
not want to defend his mode of practice, his work is nonetheless a significant cultural 
phenomenon, a symptom of our contemporary society that needs analysis. Part of my answer 
to why his work has been so successful is that it is at least to some extent what Hirst borrows 
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from the eighteenth-century sensibility of the sublime, and the continuing influence of such 
an aesthetic in present-day commodity culture, which lies at the core of its power within our 
culture. It often seems as if Hirst has taken Burke’s Enquiry, in however crude a manner, as a 
handbook for cultural production—which, of course, it was. 
 In this paper, I will be turning to one of Hirst’s more recent works, the instantly 
infamous For the Love of God (2007): a cast of a human skull in platinum, covered with 8, 
601 prime quality diamonds, which are estimated to have cost £13 million. Notoriously, the 
work was placed on sale for the sum of £50 million. This work was for Hirst something of a 
return to form, stirring up the kind of media fascination and critical interest which his work 
had rarely produced since the mid nineties. Furthermore, however ideologically 
compromised—and conceptually absurd—the piece may be, Hirst has once more produced in 
it (for me at least) a genuinely haunting, knotty image. 
 My argument in what follows is that the skull is not just capitalist art, but, in that it is 
also rather obviously art about money, it is also an art of the capitalist sublime: an art which 
presents capital as its unpresentable object of desire. My argument is in three parts. I start by 
looking at the representation that the skull makes of the unimaginable sum of money invested 
in it, and the value that it represents as an artwork. I then go on, comparing it to Hirst’s earlier 
“shark” sculpture, to discuss the way that the skull maps us into an imaginary of global 
capital, which I identify with Fredric Jameson’s “postmodern sublime.” Finally, I turn to look 
at the ambivalence which remains at its heart: it is haunted by the violence and 
exploitativeness of capital, at the same time as it embodies its ideological phantasies.2 
 
1. THE ENIGMA OF MONEY 
Visiting the skull is a very different experience from reading about it. One is led in a small 
group up a narrow staircase, and into a pitch black room. One stumbles towards the skull, the 
only visible object, sitting in the centre (one presumes) of the room, under a vertical spotlight, 
behind the glass one of Hirst’s trademark vitrines, on a plinth which raises it up to nearly head 
height. Under the single point of light in the room, it glitters, sparkles, shines—no burns—
with a ravishingly beautiful light, the piercing beams of the fiery reds, earthy yellows and icy 
blues of its diamonds twinkling like—to coin a phrase—the stars brought down to earth.3 
 I am tempted to say that the work has a powerful “presence” which its media 
representations lack, and yet this, too, would not be quite right: the experience of the skull is 
marked more with an absence—with what Lacan called a “missed encounter with the real”4—
than it ever entirely becomes present in front of us. It has an excessive material “thereness” 
which does not quite coincide with its iconicity or its “concept,” the material and 
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“conceptual” seeming to slip past—to outstrip—each other. As we look at it, it seems to 
waver between these dimensions (between icon and object, concept and aesthetic experience, 
image and material thing) and is never graspable in any one of them. It is neither “here,” in 
front of us, nor “there” in the gallery’s parallel non-site of the media representations where 
we have already seen it. As we shuffle around in the dark, the only things that we can find to 
say, in hushed tones, are the various media clichés we have already read, but these don’t 
really seem to help make sense of what we are—or are not—experiencing; as litanies, they 
seem more a ritual defence than anything else. Our allotted two minutes with the skull is 
quickly up (for there is a strict time limit to the viewing), and we are ushered out of the room 
by security guards, blinking, dazzled, and bemused. Perhaps the brevity of the allowed visit is 
the masterstroke of the generally immaculate staging of the work. We are left with a troubling 
“hole” in experience, not knowing quite what we saw, felt or knew in front of the piece. 
 At the heart of the work, then, is a staged failure of presentation, an absence which 
marks the presentation of some unpresentable Thing. The skull is an enigma, an obscure, 
sublime object of desire. My contention is that this unpresentable Thing, this sublime object 
which is at stake in the skull is capital itself. As I stood in the gallery, I remembered Guy 
Debord’s famous description of the Spectacle as “capital to such a degree of accumulation 
that it becomes image.”5 There is something I have never quite understood in the intent of the 
metaphor that Debord offers of an alchemical desublimation of abstract value into image 
(especially strange in that an image is not in fact altogether any more material than capital 
itself, even if it is now sensible), but this seemed nonetheless an apt description of Hirst’s 
skull, which appeared to have crystalised from a concentration of pure capital into something 
that still vibrated between being image and object. 
 A large part of what confounds our experience, is, of course, the very fact that we 
know the cost and the price of the work. It is this sum which the work presents to its viewers 
or comes to represent for them, in sensible form. Certainly in the newspaper discourse about 
the piece, this sum was the crunch point of the debate, and the evaluations of the work were 
often a matter of the adequacy of the skull’s visual impact to its cost. One columnist put it 
nicely in wondering whether standing in the presence of a suitcase filled with £50 million 
would have the same effect on a viewer.6 In either case, we are dealing with the problem of 
the aesthetic adequation of an unimaginable sum. In Kantian terms we are dealing with 
something akin to the mathematical sublime, where the intellectual comprehension of a 
quantity also outstrips the apprehension of our sensible imagination’s intuitions. Does the 
aesthetic fire of diamonds somehow provide an intuition whereby such a sum of money finds 
a representative within the sensuous imagination?7 
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 With money, it is not, however, just a matter of the human’s innate incapacity to 
imagine, through direct experience, extremely large quantities. Money, as an intellectual 
phenomenon, an abstraction (however concrete its effects), belongs to the realm of the 
Übersinnlich, (the supersensible) and just as with the Kantian sublime, thinking money 
involves the fundamental mismatch by which the imagination must seek to find sensuous 
adequation for the non-sensuous.8 Übersinnlich is thus not just the term which Kant uses for 
the realm of which the sublime gives us an intimation, but it is also the word that Marx uses, 
conscious surely of its connotations from philosophical aesthetics, to describe the abstractions 
involved in money and the commodity form: the commodity is “ein sinnlich übersinnliches 
Ding” (a sensible supersensible thing).9 
 Hirst’s sculpture, drawing on these characteristics of the money/commodity form, ties 
us in knots between the sensible and the abstract. We know we are in the presence of £13 
million of diamonds, and £50 million of art, but it seems impossible, standing there in the 
dark, to disentangle the effects of such a knowledge from the ravishing aesthetic effects of the 
diamonds. It is impossible to know to what extent we are responding to the idea of £50 
million, or to the aesthetic instantiation of such a sum in the object—or, in fact, to the brilliant 
theatre of the work’s presentation. What Hirst has done, of course, is to stage just such a 
problematic experience from all three elements. The work plays off the conditions of the 
sensorium fostered under capital, as described by Marx in the 1844 Paris Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts through the figure of the jewellery dealer, who can no longer see 
the sensuous beauty of the jewels he sells, so mediated is his experience of them by their 
exchange-value. The dealer in gems, argues Marx, is sensuously stunted, because he sees 
“only the commercial value” of the gems he deals in. The abstraction of money, says Marx, in 
our modern world, makes us blind to the sensuous materiality and particularity of the world.10 
Such mediation is at the heart of the uncanny sense of missed encounter in Hirst’s skull: it 
has, in part, dematerialised into the abstractions which mediate our experience of it. Like all 
commodities, though in an exacerbated form, it has become spectral,11 never entirely either 
exchange- or use-value, but suspended between the two. In this sense, the work is not 
“conceptual,” as many people have mistaken it; it revolves precisely around the gap between 
the intellectual and the material, sensuous thing. 
 
2. THE SKULL’S GLOBAL SUBLIME 
It is not, however, just the sum of money which is at stake in Hirst’s skull. Rather, it is more 
properly this sum as capital. The newspaper reports already make this quite clear in their 
interest in the distinction between the £13 million investment in the piece and the £50 million 
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price tag it carried—and hence the mysterious £37 million difference between the two.12 This 
is “surplus-value”: no longer simply money as measure, but that strangely intangible, obscure, 
even unstable and evanescent thing at the heart of capital accumulation. Such surplus is at 
once substanceless but also, paradoxically, a “weighty” sum. Something vast, powerful, real, 
and yet also ghostly—illusory like an image from the phantasmagoria. 
 It is also capital, as a power in the world rather than just money, which is at stake in 
the phantasy scene within which the work is produced and through which it addresses its 
audience. This phantasy scene is not a new one within Hirst’s work; it has been there from the 
outset. The skull replays a trick first played on me in the Saatchi gallery many years ago by 
the young Damien Hirst with his equally infamous “shark sculpture,” The Physical 
Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Somebody Living (1992). With this piece, just like the 
skull, experience of the sculpture in the gallery was preceded by rumour and media images, 
and just as with the skull, the result was a strange sense of self-dislocation as the work itself 
slipped between the site of the gallery and the non-sites of its media representations, between 
its overly material instantiation in front of us and its “concept.” Like the skull, rumours of the 
cost and price of the piece were prominent in media discourse. Part of the awe and wonder of 
the work was the awareness of the £70,000 which was said to have been spent on producing 
it, and which Saatchi had paid for the sculpture. The fact that this seemed an awesome sum 
for the production of a piece of contemporary art—and the fact that Hirst now needs to invest 
millions in order to have the same effect—marks something of the change in the artworld 
over the intervening fifteen years. 
 Hirst’s discussions, in interview, of the production of Physical Impossibility reveal the 
phantasy scene which underlies it, and which I also hold underlies For the Love of God. He 
describes how the work grew from an experience working making phone calls for a market 
research company. It was from the resulting increased confidence in his telephone manner 
and in what can be achieved with the telephone that Hirst organised and raised sponsorship 
for the Freeze exhibition that launched his career.  
 From it also emerges a phantasy of the power of telecommunications, when backed 
with money, to set an enormous logistical machine in motion across the world from one’s 
armchair or desk—to have something as huge and exotic as a 14-foot tiger shark caught on 
the other side of the planet, refrigerated and shipped, to have a vitrine built by expert 
technicians, and have a team preserve the shark and assemble the piece… Hirst described this 
phantasy in interview with Gordon Burn: 
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You can get anything over the phone. I actually wondered if there was 
no limit to it. I wanted to do a shark and thought, No, that’s … 
impossible; you can’t do that. … I thought, Shit, you can get it over the 
phone. … With the phone you become totally international. You can go 
beyond continents. You can go anywhere in the world with a phone.13 
 
 This phantasy clearly mimes the movement of the Kantian sublime, of “das Gefühl 
einer augenblicklichen Hemmung der Lebenskräfte und darauf sogleich folgenden desto 
stärkern Ergießung derselben” (the feeling of a momentary inhibition of our life-forces 
followed by their gushing out all the more powerfully), as we are faced first with a sense of 
absolute powerlessness in the world scene (“no that’s … impossible”), but then, with an 
ecstatic vision of an expansion of the self into the “beyond continents” of 
telecommunicational power, an image of the “Unendlichkeit” (endlessness) and 
“unbegrenzten Vermögens” (unbounded capacities) which Kant associates with the 
sublime.14 Hirst’s phantasy is clearly a phantasy of the power of global capital and its 
communicational networks, and what it is to inhabit the heart of their web. These networks 
within which Hirst’s sculpture situates itself are exactly those which Fredric Jameson 
theorises in his vision of a “postmodern sublime,” as forming an unthinkable and 
unpresentable totality within which the subject of global capital must attempt—however 
vainly—to map him- or herself.15 Jameson’s description of the postmodern sublime makes a 
lot of sense of the fascinated wonder and perplexity Physical Impossibility elicited in 
audiences who already knew the price tag, and who, in front of its pristinely technological 
surfaces, could only imagine its scene of production. We too, then, partake in Hirst’s phantasy 
of the global sublime, as the consumers for whose benefit (and gallery entrance fee) the 
spectacle is being staged. A not-insubstantial part of the pleasure of the sculpture may well be 
in the phantasy of the command of a global process which this offers.16  
 Where I depart from Jameson’s analysis, however, is with regard to his understanding 
of this sublime of global capitalism as an entirely new thing. Jameson discusses the sublime 
of Burke and Kant as posited in relation not to the totalising “second nature” of capitalist 
modernity, but to nature itself. However, it is my contention that capital—with its 
formlessness, its constant passing beyond its own finitude, its implacable force—has always 
been at the heart of the notion of the sublime, a notion which, after all, arose to prominence in 
Western criticism and aesthetics alongside the massive transformations of the institutions and 
practices of modern capital which P. G. M. Dickson has termed a “financial revolution,” and 
alongside the rise of the discourse of economics itself.17 If I am right in this contention—one, 
unfortunately, which I cannot fully explore within the confines of this essay—then the natural 
sublime of Romanticism and its successors is itself a displaced and reassuring projection of a 
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relation of the modern subject to capital, and the Jamesonian sublime is at the heart of a 
modern as well as a postmodern sensibility. 
 Hirst’s phantasy scene, loaded as it is with the Jamesonian sublime, thus in fact has its 
precursor in that foundational text of political economy, Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, 
where Smith describes the power of consumption of even the lowliest worker in capitalist 
economy, thanks to the economic organisation of commodity production and the division of 
labour. Such consumption stretches the labourer’s economic power across the globe and over 
a myriad of other producers, and makes him, thinks Smith, more powerful than the most 
absolute despot of a “primitive” tribal culture. Smith writes:  
Observe the accommodation of the most common artificer or daylabourer in a 
civilized and thriving country, and you will perceive that the number of people, of 
whose industry a part, though but a small part, has been employed in procuring him 
this accommodation, exceeds all computation. The woollen coat, for example, which 
covers the day-labourer, as coarse and rough as it may appear, is the produce of the 
joint labour of a great multitude of workmen. The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, 
the wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the 
fuller, the dresser, with many others, must all join their different arts in order to 
complete even this homely production. How many merchants and carriers, besides, 
must have been employed in transporting the materials from some of those workmen 
to others who often live in a very distant part of the country? How much commerce 
and navigation in particular, how many ship-builders, sailors, sail-makers, rope-
makers, must have been employed in order to bring together the different drugs 
made use of by the dyer, which often come from the remotest corners of the 
world?18 
Smith’s catalogue of workers is notable in foregrounding, just as Hirst’s telecommunications 
phantasy does, capital’s networks of command, commerce and communication. His 
description of proto-industrial production shares with Hirst’s shark the task of envisioning 
and mapping an unimaginable geo-economic scene. Smith continues at great length to list the 
similarly vast numbers, and the unthinkable geographic spread, of those employed in the 
global affair of producing the simple tools, food, habitation and furnishings of the lifestyle of 
the “daylabourer,” and, in a gesture which discounts the actual destitution of such a figure, 
concludes:  
if we examine, I say, all these things, and consider what a variety of labour is 
employed about each of them, we shall be sensible that, without the assistance 
and co-operation of many thousands, the very meanest person in a civilized 
country could not be provided, even according to, what we very falsely imagine, 
the easy and simple manner in which he is commonly accommodated. Compared, 
indeed, with the more extravagant luxury of the great, his accommodation must 
no doubt appear extremely simple and easy; and yet it may be true, perhaps, that 
the accommodation of an European prince does not always so much exceed that 
of an industrious and frugal peasant, as the accommodation of the latter exceeds 
that of many an African king, the absolute masters of the lives and liberties of ten 
thousand naked savages.19 
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Like Hirst, Smith produces a reassuring—and sublimely thrilling—image of the omnipotence 
of the consumer, and the echo between the two suggests that Hirst’s phantasy inheres in the 
ideological imaginary of a capitalist modernity which has long been “global” in its ambitions. 
 The sublime in its heyday, too, functioned as an aesthetic of colonial or imperial forms 
of globalisation, and in Hirst’s shark there are echoes of eighteenth-century uses of the 
sublime in imperialist mirabilia such as John Singleton Copley’s Watson and the Shark 
(1778). Copley’s painting, like Physical Impossibility, uses the figure of a shark to image 
capital at work, and would have positioned its first viewers within a scene of intercontinental 
commerce, allowing them to imagine their presence in London in relation to the distant places 
into which their wealth reached. It depicts a scene from the life of Brook Watson—who by 
the time the picture was painted was already a pillar of London’s merchant community, and 
who would go on to be both Lord Mayor of London and a Baronet—as he is rescued from the 
jaws of a shark by a crew of trusty subordinates whilst on a trading expedition to Havana. It is 
an image of capital’s daring exploits, fighting against a counter-purposive nature at the limits 
of empire and of human control—a wild, sublime nature which its audience could imagine as 
being so very unlike the familiar and domesticated nature of pastoral England. Like Copley’s 
painting (which in its own day also made a “sensation” at the Royal Academy) Hirst’s shark 
brings back to the homely centre of empire something of its wild and exotic margins. 20 
 
3. THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE CAPITALIST SUBLIME 
Of course, the point of this discussion of Physical Impossibility is to enable us to discover 
once more the same mechanisms of address in For the Love of God. Once more we are faced 
with an instantiation of what can be mobilised in cultural production—this time by £13 
million. The Hirstean phantasy thus reiterates itself on an altogether larger scale, and one 
which, although even £50 million is still a drop in the ocean of the planetary flows of capital, 
takes another step towards adequation of a sum that might be significant within this. Such a 
significance is marked by the much-reported fact that the sourcing of the diamonds for the 
work caused a “blip” in the global diamond market.21  
 Like the shark, it brings something of the wild and exotic fringes of what once was 
empire into the London gallery, with its allusions to ancient Aztec art. But it also brings the 
geography of empire back in the form of its relation to the diamond trade itself, a brutal 
industry in which fantastical profits are made off the back of some of the poorest and most 
exploited workers, and which has fuelled bloody civil wars in countries such as Sierra Leone. 
Hirst and his galleries were quick to emphasise that the diamonds used for the skull were “all 
ethically sourced, each with written guarantees in compliance with United Nations 
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resolutions.”22 However, all that such guarantees entail is their not having been used to 
finance a guerrilla army: ethical sourcing is no guarantee even that the diamonds are not the 
object of armed struggle, and it says nothing about the character of the regime which governs 
and profits from the mining. Beyond this, it says even less of the conditions of diamond 
miners, people often displaced from their traditional means of life and forced into work at 
below-subsistence levels of remuneration by those above them who have a monopoly over the 
supply chain. Though less spectacular than the bloody warfare it has often stimulated, the 
diamond industry is even in its peacetime incarnations and running according to UN 
regulation, hardly less deadly or rapacious, harbouring within itself a form of violence which 
is lethal and systematic but normalised as part of the regular, legal functioning of a trade.23 
The most unpleasant dimension of Hirst’s skull—and of some of the things that Hirst has said 
about it—is a certain disavowal of this violence. Will Self, for example, reports a 
conversation with Hirst: 
When … I’d suggested to Hirst that some people find it crass, this 
unprecedented condensation of wealth, in the light of so much human 
suffering for a want of a few quid, he muttered gnomically, “Dunno mate, 
it’s unavoidable really… I mean, I think it offers people hope.” But the 
following day he sent me a text message: “When you asked me yesterday 
about all the money that was spent on the skull when people are starving, I 
was just thinking that people don’t mind money being spent on beautiful 
things, it’s ugly things that are the problem, and there’s plenty of ugly 
f***ing buildings in the world that cost way more than the skull.” 24 
 
The claims made for the work to transcend death through beauty, in an art taking refuge from 
the contingent political and social contexts of the contemporary world in supposedly grand 
and universal themes, are all the more disturbing when death and violence are in fact at the 
heart of the production of the work itself. What kind of a transcendence of death can the work 
offer in this case, and how obscene is it to play its beauty against the brutality of its 
production? In interview, Hirst has at least registered his belated realisation about the 
diamond trade: “That’s when you stop laughing. You might have created something that 
people might die because of. I guess I felt like Oppenheimer or something. What have I 
done?” 25 
 The skull, like much of Hirst’s oeuvre, maintains an unfortunate muteness in front of 
these issues. Such issues, however, although not an explicit thematic of the work, remain part 
of what “haunts” it; not exactly a “content,” since such concerns are hardly held “within” the 
sculpture, but rather, more like Derrrida’s pererga, these are matters which, though ostensibly 
peripheral, nonetheless find themselves inscribed at the very heart of the work.26 The presence 
of the diamond trade and the uncomfortable ethical dilemmas raised by the work—whatever 
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its “intentions”—permeate the discourse which it has elicited, and form an unavoidable co-
ordinate of interpretation.  
 This is, I think, due to an irreducible ambivalence which is structured into the 
capitalist sublime, which, just like capital itself, is riven by the social antagonisms which 
constitute it. If Hirst’s work, presenting the thrill of capital as mastery and power, is 
ideological, we must remember that ideology, after all, can only disavow social contradiction 
by first raising it in an image which always threatens to turn dialectic. 
 Hirst’s shark, too, is haunted by capital’s violence. The phantasy which I proposed to 
lie at its heart is not just one of power. There is a certain reversibility in the phantasy, with the 
mortified flesh of the shark also providing a point of identification for the viewer: Hirst has 
said that “empathy with dead meat” is an important aim of his work.27 The telephone research 
work from which Hirst’s phantasy emerges in not an experience of mastery through 
technology at all, but of numbing powerlessness, being stuck in a cubicle, speaking pre-
scripted dialogue to someone a computer has already pre-dialled for you. The moribund flesh 
of the shark is an apt image of the common experience of the labouring body caught within 
and subjected to the flows of capital.  
 This zombie body returns to haunt Hirst’s sculptural phantasies of the power of 
capital, and marks the irreducible antagonism between capital and labour on which capital is 
based, and of which it cannot rid itself even in its most ideological incarnations. If Hirst’s 
phantasy, as I have argued, comparing it with Adam Smith’s, is a variation on the one at the 
heart of commodity consumption itself, this phantasy, too, has the same ambivalence at its 
heart. The power we exert in the act of purchase is only at the cost of our own subjection. 
There is an identificatory self-recognition in the commodity as desired object, where our own 
commodification as labouring bodies is returned to us. Perhaps there is a masochistic element 
to this, and perhaps, even, capital captates our desire through a narcissistic, oceanic 
investment in the death drive (not a million miles away from the ambivalent and oceanic 
urges which have often been discovered at the heart of the sublime) as much as it does 
through the more rational and “positive” pleasures of mastery. Hirst’s work, though it stops 
short before raising such a mechanism to consciousness and critique, seems to exacerbate 
such a deathly narcissism of capital and commodity desire, feeding off this for its affects, and 
bringing it a form of visibility. 
 Thus Hirst’s work remains haunted by the violence of capital. If, as I started out 
arguing, the skull serves as a representation of “capital,” the face which this wears is, of 
course, most literally that of death, which is all too appropriate. The deathliness of Hirst’s For 
the Love of God manifests itself not just in the fairly banal image of the skull, but in its 
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sparkling but sterile, gunmetal-grey surfaces, the dystopian sheen of which reminds one, 
when one comes up against the object in all its materiality, more of a piece of futuristic, 
precision-engineered military hardware than of a piece of jewellery, redolent as it is of the 
cyborg’s armoured skull in the Terminator films. There is something decidedly apocalyptic 
about the vision of this skull. In equal parts as it is beautiful, it is also chilling. This is capital: 
seductive but deathly, and all the more seductive in deathliness. 
 The imaginary of capital has long exhibited an intimacy with the morbid, and it 
partakes of a far older pact between power and the aesthetics of death, with Hirst’s skull, for 
example, drawing on a tradition of the memento mori which saw its flowering at another 
moment of the imperial expansion of capital, with the expanding commercial network of the 
Dutch Republic.28 But Hirst’s avowed intention, attempting to trump death with the obscene 
beauty of the capitalist sublime, also inscribes him within a tradition stretching back to the 
death mask of Tutankhamun and beyond, of the representational logic of a wealth whose 
intense degree of accumulation—necessarily based on servitude and death—allows its 
transfiguration into aesthetic spectacle. Such a logic is obviously much older than modern 
capitalism, but it is nonetheless one inscribed in capital’s heart. Today, such an attempt at the 
aesthetic transcendence of death as we have with Hirst’s skull partakes of a specifically 
modern logic of the relation of death to the accumulation of power and wealth. Jean 
Baudrillard, for example, has diagnosed at the basis of modern power an increasing 
exclusion—since the sixteenth century—of death from the realm of the living.29 It is such an 
exclusion of death, and the resultant fear of it, which ratifies the powers of the modern 
Church (with its promises that death is not the end for the faithful), the modern State (with its 
health services and its provision of the safety of law and order), and of the commodity (which 
also, through the images of advertising, offers us a kind of an eternal youth and glamour). 
Money itself, with its transfiguration of the fleeting world of the flesh (its becoming “ein 
sinnlich übersinnliches Ding”) into abstract and eternal exchange-value serves at the core of 
this nexus of promises of the defeat of life’s finitude. Hirst’s oeuvre, rotating around 
medicine, the bureaucratisation of space, a (rather flip) religiosity, the saccharine surfaces of 
consumption and the mysteries of value, thematically paces out the territories of such 
promises. Ultimately, of course, each of these promises of life is founded on a renewed pact 
with death, and it is this deathliness, lurking, as we have seen in this essay, in the phantasies 
of the commodity form and of the globalised political economy of capital, that reasserts itself 
in Hirst’s bejewelled Terminator skull. 
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